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ABSTRACT: 
 
Purpose – This study explores the potential relationship between the existence of a 
professional oversight body and certain country-specific education regulations in auditing and 
the country‘s perceived level of corruption.  
 
Method - Drawing on data from the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) database, 
we used univariate (Mann-Whitney U) and multivariate analysis techniques to test the 
difference between countries perceived level of corruption based on whether they have or 
have not developed professional oversight bodies and licensing regulations.  
 
Findings – Results suggest that countries that have established an audit profession oversight 
body are, indeed, perceived to be less corrupt. Similarly, countries that require practical 
experience, academic study, and a licensing examination in order to practice auditing are 
perceived to be less corrupt. On the other hand, the analysis shows that requiring auditors to 
fulfil continuing education requirements is not significantly related to corruption. Overall, 
higher aggregate audit competency standards are associated with lower levels of perceived 
corruption.  
 
Research Implications – The study provides important insights for policy-makers, business 
leaders, education and the audit profession as a whole. Future research directions are also 
suggested. 
 
Originality/Value – This paper provides some of the first empirical support for the 
relationship between corruption and the use of oversight bodies and licensing regulations in 
professional auditing at a country level.   
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Introduction 
This study explores the potential relationship between audit education, audit profession 
oversight bodies and a country‘s perceived level of corruption. In recent years, as a result of 
large-scale scandals in organizations throughout the world, management scholars (Mele and 
Rosanas, 2005; Hooker, 2009; Albrecht and Albrecht, 2009; Burke, Tomlinson, and Cooper; 
2011), investment circles (Pujas, 2003), and regulator communities (Farber, 2005) have had a 
renewed and increased focus on the topic of business ethics and corruption from a cross 
cultural perspective.  
Research on corruption has demonstrated that institutions such as an audit profession 
oversight body are an important deterrent to corruption (Lederman et al., 2005). Given that 
many instances of corruption reported in the press have to do with financial fraud and a lack 
of internal control over financial assets, it follows that understanding the relationship between 
certain country-specific audit regulations and corruption would be beneficial in helping 
countries fight corruption and, in the process, encourage the creation of more efficient audit 
regulations.  
This research uses data from 87 countries collected by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) to explore the relationship between the existence of an audit profession 
oversight body and corruption, the relationship between requirements to obtain an audit 
license and corruption, and the relationship between requirements to retain an audit license 
and corruption. Further, this research develops an aggregate measure of audit education, 
which we refer to as the Index of Audit Education Standards (IAES). Using this index, we 
examine the relationship between audit education standards, presence of oversight body and 
corruption while controlling for a country’s level of economic freedom and rule of law. 
Results from the univariate analyses suggest that countries that have established audit 
profession oversight bodies are perceived to be less corrupt. Similarly, countries that require 
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practical experience, academic study, and a licensing examination in order to receive an audit 
license are perceived to be less corrupt. However, the analysis shows that requiring auditors 
to fulfil continuing education requirements, after an initial license has been granted, does not 
appear to be associated with a lower level of perceived corruption. Results from the 
multivariate analysis provide support for a significant relationship between the index of audit 
education standards and corruption. 
 
Corruption and Auditing 
The definition of corruption involves illegal practices that are often associated with 
illegal cash payments, misallocation of assets, and other inappropriate economically driven 
transactions (Husted, 1999; Treisman, 2000). Researchers have also suggested that corruption 
includes financial statement fraud and other similar scandals (Albrecht, et al., 2007). 
Corruption can involve both public and private settings and can occur in profit and not-for-
profit organizations as well as government. In this paper, corruption is defined as the abuse of 
entrusted power for personal gain. 
Research has suggested that there are many mitigating and intervening factors that help 
explain the relationship between various attributes of a country and corruption. For example 
research by Treisman (2000) suggests that a country‘s level of Protestantism, history of 
British rule, and use of a federal system of governance are negatively correlated with 
corruption. Similarly, DiRienzo and colleagues (2007) provide evidence to suggest that the 
accessibility of information within a country is negatively associated with corruption. Other 
scholars have suggested that inequality of income distribution and government size are 
mitigating factors of corruption (Husted, 1999). Finally, researchers have suggested that 
economic freedom (Henderson, 1999), competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999), human 
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development, judicial quality, credit ratings, and the accessibility of newspapers are all 
mitigating factors of corruption (Galtung, 1997). 
The effect that corruption has on countries throughout the world is devastating. For 
example, scholars have suggested that corruption negatively affects the level of GDP per 
capita, investment activity, international trade and price stability (Bardhan, 1997). Research 
has also suggested that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and even discourages 
the creation of new firms (DeSoto, 1989; Jackson et al., 2010). As a result, corrupt practices 
raise the real and hidden cost of doing international business, which in turn, negatively affects 
consumers. Mauro (1995) and Burki and Perry (1998) claim that corruption reduces 
economic growth by decreasing private investment. Corruption also limits development, as 
measured by per capita income, and decreases literacy (Kaufman and Kraay, 2002). Some 
scholars have provided evidence to support the notion that corruption reduces revenue 
generated through taxation, contributing to the inability of some governments to function 
properly (Tanzi, 1998). Finally, corruption has been credited with eroding trust in the 
political system and reducing interpersonal trust in society (Seligson, 2002). While there are 
many different views on corruption, it is generally acknowledged that the level of corruption 
in a country reflects the degree to which a society is functional (Steiner, 1999). 
Recent studies suggest that political institutions may play an important role in fighting 
corruption. Political institutions such as democracies, parliamentary systems, political 
stability and freedom of press have all been associated with lower levels of corruption 
(Lederman et al., 2005). Since institutions shape the rules of interaction in society, 
institutions have a direct effect on the incidence of corruption within society. As a result, an 
effective auditing profession – as an institution (Richardson, 1987) – should directly affect a 
country‘s level of corruption. 
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In the international setting, in order to curb corruption, various oversight bodies are in 
charge of setting auditing and accounting standards that favour transparency. For example, 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issues the International 
Standards on Auditing (ISA). Similarly, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) is responsible for setting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 
the United States, for example, institutions such as the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the United States Congress have 
implemented standards and passed laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to deter corruption. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits 
United States listed companies from making bribes in foreign countries and requires them to 
have internal controls in place to prevent bribes from occurring. Failure to have sufficient 
controls in place, as evidenced by a bribe, can result in large fines for United States 
companies and can even result in the company‘s chief executive officer being imprisoned. 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires management of every United States 
listed company to assess the adequacy of its internal controls and requires the company’s 
external auditor to independently opine on the adequacy of those controls. 
Various theoretical contributions have suggested a link between corruption and 
auditing. For example, research by Alam (1995) suggests that managerial and accounting 
skills are possibly correlated to corruption. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that a first step 
in reducing corruption should be to create an effective accounting and audit profession to 
prevent theft from government. Finally, Sun (1999) suggests that good accounting regulations 
in China have already served to lower corruption by uncovering obvious violations and 
deterring future violations. Since corruption is detrimental to growth in areas with weak rule 
of law and low government effectiveness (Meon and Sekkat, 2005), corruption is especially 
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widespread in countries that lack transparency and have weak or non-existent operations, 
processes, and laws (LaPalombara, 1994).  
While the literature on corruption has addressed many aspects of the economy, there 
has been little or no empirical research that builds a direct relationship between audit 
education, oversight boards, regulatory institutions and perceived corruption. This research 
attempts to build such a link by examining the relationship between certain country-specific 
audit profession regulations and corruption.  
 
Auditing Processes 
Most researchers today view accounting, including the role of auditing, as an important 
element of economic reality, rather than a reflection of it. They have provided a view that 
auditing actually enhances the visibility and transparency of an economy (Becker and 
Neuheuser, 1975; Burchell et al., 1980). Financial statement auditing has been the primary 
service provided by auditors and accountants for most of the last 100 years (Knechel, 2001). 
While auditing standards and technology have become increasingly complex, the basic focus 
of the audit has not changed – to provide an opinion about the fairness of periodic financial 
reports. The AICPA, in its Codification of Auditing Standards, has stated that: 
 
“The objective of the ordinary audit of financial statements by the independent auditor is the 
expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present…a financial position, results 
of operations and its cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” 
(AICPA Codification of Auditing Standards, AU Section 110.01, 1972). 
 
However, unfortunately, even in countries with an advanced auditing profession, such 
as that of the United States, corruption still exists. For example, in the years 2001 and 2002, 
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the United States experienced several major frauds, including both Enron and WorldCom. 
These major frauds and other types of corruption (Tyco, Aldelphia and others) led to 
increased regulation within the United States, including the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act which created a quasi-governmental accounting oversight body called the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Various other countries have adopted similar 
legislation and organized similar oversight bodies. 
The basic purpose of an audit profession oversight body, like the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, is to oversee the regulation and practice of the auditing 
profession within a country. The audit profession oversight body does this by monitoring the 
quality of the audit function in relation to economically significant entities and ensuring 
independent oversight of the regulation of the audit profession. Although, in most countries, 
the audit profession oversight body differs slightly in scope and regulation, the purpose of an 
audit profession oversight body is to have an independent body to oversee the audit 
profession and to ensure the quality of audits. 
In addition to the existence of an audit profession oversight body, the IFAC has 
recommended that regulations requiring audit education and practical experience be 
established within each country. The purpose of such regulation is to produce competent 
professional auditors capable of making a positive contribution to society (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2003a). International education recommendations for auditors 
infer that education and practical experience for professional auditors should provide a 
foundation of knowledge, skills, and values that enable them to learn and adapt to change 
throughout their professional lives (International Federation of Accountants, 2003b). 
 
Hypothesis Development 
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Logic would suggest that establishing audit profession oversight bodies and requiring 
various forms of auditor education are important deterrents to corruption. Audit education 
helps ensure that auditors have a knowledge base as well as various competencies 
(International Federation of Accountants, 2003b).  Such competencies help make auditors 
more vigilant and aware of possible corruption.  In turn, perpetrators, when audited by 
competent auditors, will perceive less opportunity to engage in corrupt practices.  Along this 
same line of reasoning, an audit profession oversight body ensures that the audit profession is 
overseen and monitored.  When the audit profession is overseen and monitored by an 
independent body, it is much less likely to engage in activities that may compromise an audit, 
creating less opportunity for perpetrators to engage in corruption. 
The need for audit profession oversight bodies to be established in countries throughout 
the world has been a recurring topic among regulators in recent years. It has been suggested 
that auditors should be subject to oversight that acts and is seen to act in the public interest 
(International Organization of Securities Commission, 2002). This independent oversight 
should be formed to exercise comprehensive oversight over activities that affect the public 
interest—particularly the establishment of auditing, ethics, and education standards for 
auditors (International Federation of Accountants, 2006). 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the Financial Reporting Council established a 
professional oversight board in order to build investor, market and public confidence in the 
financial and governance stewardship of listed and other entities. This is accomplished 
through the creation of an audit profession oversight body that provides independent 
oversight of the regulation of the auditing profession by the recognized supervisory and 
qualifying bodies, monitors the quality of the auditing function in relation to economically 
significant entities, and oversees the regulation of the auditing profession by professional 
accountancy bodies (Financial Reporting Council, 2006). 
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An audit profession oversight body should generally include the following: (1) a 
mechanism to ensure that auditors are qualified and competent before being licensed to 
perform audits and that they maintain professional competence, (2) a mechanism to require 
that auditors are independent of the entities they audit, both in fact and in appearance, 
(independence-in-fact is generally understood to mean an unbiased and objective viewpoint 
when performing audit tests, evaluating results, and issuing audit reports, (Kornish and 
Levine, 2004)), (3) a mechanism for a body, acting in the public interest, to oversee the 
quality of auditing, independence, and ethical standards, and (4) a mechanism to require 
auditors to be subject to a body that is independent of the audit profession (Diplock, 2005). 
An audit profession oversight body should act in the public interest, and have an 
appropriate membership, an adequate charter of responsibilities and power, and adequate 
funding so that it is not under the control of the auditing profession. The body should 
establish a process for performing regular reviews of audit procedures and practices of firms 
that audit the financial statements of listed public companies. The body should be able to 
stipulate remedial measures for problems as well as initiate disciplinary proceedings and 
sanctions on auditors and audit firms where appropriate (International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, 2002). 
Major regulatory organizations such as the IFAC and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions have recommended that an audit profession oversight body be 
established in every country. It is logical to assume that those countries with a body that 
provides independent oversight of the regulation of auditing, monitors the quality of the 
auditing function in relation to economically significant entities, and oversees the regulation 
of the audit profession would be more adept at inhibiting corruption through independent 
audits.  It follows that such countries would be perceived to be less corrupt than countries that 
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have not established a body to perform these functions. To empirically evaluate this 
proposition, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H1: Countries that have audit profession oversight bodies are perceived to be less corrupt 
than countries that have no audit profession oversight bodies. 
 
The International Organization of Securities Commission (2002) states that one of the 
basic mechanisms that the audit profession oversight body ensures is that professional 
auditors are qualified and competent before being licensed to perform audits. The audit 
profession oversight body also ensures that auditors maintain professional competence. While 
the hypothesis above simply proposes whether or not an audit profession oversight body has 
been established within a country, the next hypotheses deal directly with (1) the requirements 
to obtain an auditing license within a given country and (2) the requirements to retain an 
auditing license once the license has initially been granted to individuals. The next 
hypotheses will rely heavily on the international education standards that have been 
developed by the IFAC. The purpose of these standards is to help guide and set education and 
training standards for auditors throughout the world. 
Researchers have suggested that a lack of professional education is one of the problems 
contributing to ethical and intellectual failures among accounting practitioners including 
auditors (Gray et al., 1994). The content of professional audit education should provide a 
background of accounting, finance and related knowledge; organizational and business 
knowledge; and information technology knowledge and competences (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2003b). The study of audit education should be long enough and 
intensive enough to permit candidates to gain the professional knowledge required for 
professional competence. The requirement that academic study be necessary in order for 
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individuals to obtain an auditing license should increase the confidence of stakeholders of the 
auditing community or outside observers that audits will be competently performed.  Thus, 
 
H2: Countries that require any level of academic study (formal or informal) in order to 
obtain an auditing license are perceived to be less corrupt than countries which do not 
require any level of academic study to obtain an auditing license. 
 
International accounting education standards promulgated by the IFAC Executive 
Education Committee (International Federation of Accountants, 2003c) recommend that 
practical experience in accounting is considered necessary before individuals may be able to 
present themselves to the public as professional auditors. The requirements for practical 
experience may vary from one country to another. It has been argued that practical 
experience enhances an individual‘s understanding of organizations and fosters the 
acquisition of specific technical know-how (Ashton, 1991). Additionally, experience helps 
individuals relate auditing work to other functions and activities and encourages individuals 
to become more aware of the environment in which services are provided, assists in the 
developing of professional values, ethics, and attitudes in practical and real-life situations, 
and enables individuals to have an opportunity to work at progressive levels of responsibility 
(Messier Jr., 1983). Such experience should be perceived as a valuable asset for professional 
auditors resulting in a higher level of auditing competence. Therefore,  
 
H3: Countries that require practical experience in order to obtain an auditing license are 
perceived to be less corrupt than countries that do not require practical experience in order 
to obtain an auditing license. 
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International accounting standards recommend that countries have in place assessment 
procedures to ensure that auditors and other professionals are appropriately qualified. It is 
recommended that an assessment of capabilities and competence be performed (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2003d). Assuring that audit professionals are competent and 
capable means that these individuals have the capabilities and competencies expected of them 
by employers, clients, and the public. Furthermore, qualified auditors have the ability to 
protect the public interest by providing fair financial information. By so doing, these 
professionals provide credibility to the audit and accounting professions (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2006). Requiring a licensing exam for auditors is an important 
assessment procedure to ensure that auditors are appropriately qualified. It would be expected 
that countries that have put in place assessment procedures, such as an auditing licensing 
exam requirement, would engender perceptions of requiring at least a minimum level of 
aptitude in thwarting corruption. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H4: Countries that require a licensing exam in order to obtain an auditing license are 
perceived to be less corrupt than countries that do not require a licensing exam in order to 
obtain an auditing license. 
 
The IFAC International Education Standard #7 recommends that a continuing 
professional development requirement be an essential part of a professional auditor‘s 
continued ability to perform well (International Federation of Accountants, 2004). This is 
expected because rules and regulations often change from year to year and auditors should be 
knowledgeable about such changes in order to meet the needs of the public. Continuing 
professional development is considered to be relevant, verifiable, and have measurable 
learning activities and outcomes. The purpose of these learning activities and outcomes is to 
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enable auditors to perform competently within their professional environments (International 
Federation of Accountants, 2006). Standards further recommend that auditors continue to 
develop and maintain the competencies that are demanded by their professional roles as well 
as the users of their services. As a result, those countries that require auditors to have 
continued professional development should be perceived to be less corrupt. Thus, 
 
H5: Countries that require auditors to have continuing professional development (CPD) in 
order to retain their auditing licenses are perceived to be less corrupt than countries that 
do not require auditors to have continuing professional development. 
 
Hypotheses 1 through 5 examine the relationship between country-specific 
characteristics of the audit profession and the perceived corruption of a country; however, 
these hypotheses do not provide sufficient evidence to establish a unified effect of audit 
education standards on corruption. Therefore, in the next hypothesis, we evaluate the entire, 
combined effect of audit education on corruption. This hypothesis is formalized as follows: 
 
H6: Countries that require higher levels of education standards for the audit profession 
are perceived to be less corrupt than countries that require lower levels of education 
standards for the audit profession. 
 
 
 
 
Data and Research Design 
Sample and Variables 
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To obtain the data needed for this research, we relied on the IFAC database. 
Specifically, we retrieved data from 87 surveys that were reported in the “Assessment of the 
Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework” section of the International Federation of 
Accountants website. The surveys provided information about the country of origin‘s 
statutory framework, audit standards, ethics, education, public sector accounting standards, 
private sector accounting standards, and quality assurance processes. These surveys were 
completed by representatives from the various IFAC member bodies in various countries 
throughout the world. The respondents who completed these surveys were professionals who 
had practiced auditing within the IFAC member‘s country of origin. They were also 
professionals who, as deemed by the IFAC member, are capable of accurately reporting 
auditing regulation for their respective country. This assessment has provided financial, 
accounting, and auditing information that was previously unavailable for the majority of 
countries throughout the world. 
Our particular interest in the IFAC survey focused on questions 78 and 79, in which 
respondents identified the presence of oversight bodies, and the requirements for obtaining 
and retaining an auditing license within each country. At the time that the assessment was 
pulled, data from 87 countries were available for use in the analysis. In order to help the 
reader better understand which countries were included in the study, Table I provides a 
descriptive analysis of the countries that completed the survey. This analysis first describes 
the countries that require an audit profession oversight body. The analysis then shows the 
countries that require academic study, practical experience, a licensing exam and continuing 
professional development in order to receive and retain an auditing license within each 
country. Finally, the table provides information on education quality, requirements for years 
of professional experience and requirements for continuing professional development. Based 
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upon the information in the analysis, we construct a composite score to better understand the 
level of audit education standards within each country. 
 
Insert TABLE I about Here 
 
The measurement for corruption was taken from the 2006 Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2006). The CPI has been 
suggested to be the most comprehensive quantitative indicator of cross-country corruption 
available (DiRienzo et al., 2007). A study by Lancaster and Montinola (1997) suggested that, 
while no index or measure of corruption is perfect, the CPI is robust. The CPI ranks countries 
in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials, 
politicians and the private sector. The CPI is a composite index, drawing on corruption-
related data from numerous surveys. The index gives a composite score between one and ten, 
with ten being those countries with the least amount of perceived corruption and one being 
those countries with the highest amount of perceived corruption.  
The difficulty in assessing the actual level of corruption within a country has been 
recognized for many years (Johnston, 2000; Jain, 2001; Lederman et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, hard empirical data on corruption is typically biased and lacks validity 
(Lambsdorff, 2007). Data such as prosecutions or court cases, for example, do not reflect 
actual levels of corruption. Rather, they are evidence of the level of which prosecutors, 
courts, and media expose corruption. As a result, since actual levels of corruption are 
unobservable (Kurer, 2005), researchers must rely on the perception of corruption as built on 
the experience and perceptions of those who are most directly confronted with the realities of 
corruption. The Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International provides such a 
measure. 
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Research Design 
In order to test the hypotheses 1 through 5, the data that were retrieved from the IFAC 
database were analysed by performing several Mann-Whitney U tests. The Mann-Whitney U 
test is a non-parametric hypothesis test for which normal distribution is not required 
(Bergman et al., 2000). Such tests are performed to determine if there are differences in the 
perceived corruption of groups of countries who use the hypothesized variables (e.g. 
oversight bodies, education requirements, etc.) and those countries that do not employ such 
standards. 
Before testing hypothesis 6, we built a composite index using the hypothesized 
variables from hypotheses 2 – 5. The Index of Audit Education Standards (IAES) corresponds 
to weighted composite that accounts for the existence of requirements such as, accounting 
and auditing academic study, professional experience, proficiency exams, and continuing 
professional development. In order to consider the effect that a country’s quality of education 
may have on the requirements for academic study within a country, we weighted the 
existence of academic study with Global Competitiveness Report’s “Higher Education and 
Training” measurement (World Economic Forum, 2009). Similarly, instead of only 
considering the existence or not of a professional experience requirement for individuals to 
obtain an audit license, the IAES index also weighted the number of years of professional 
experience each country requires. Table I depicts the total IAES composite and the variables 
used in its construction. Further, we weighted the continuing professional development 
(CPD) measure with several characteristics that describe the CPD requirement in each 
country. These characteristics include: (a) The categories or items that are required to 
maintain professional competence through continued professional development within each 
country, (b) The required hours of continuing professional development within each country, 
(c) The monitoring of continuing professional development within each country, and (d) The 
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monitoring processes of continuing professional development within each country. Appendix 
A shows the features that were used to weight the continuing professional development 
measure. Information on years of professional experience and continuing professional 
development requirements were obtained from the IFAC database Survey - Part 2. 
To test hypothesis 6, we regressed the index of IAES and the existence of an oversight 
body with corruption while controlling for intervening effects. The control variables used in 
these models includes both economic freedom and rule of law. Economic freedom represents 
the fundamental right of every human to be in command of his/her own labour and property. 
Economic freedom is a common control variable when measuring corruption, and previous 
research has indicated that economic freedom represents a significant effect on corruption 
(Ades and Di Tella, 1999, Treisman, 2000). Other studies have emphasized the essential role 
of rule of law for a country’s economic development and level of corruption (Nwabuzor, 
2005). Efficient rule of law offers a stable structure for economic activity. Failure to enforce 
property rights and contracts undermines the incentives for agents to participate in productive 
activities and consequently increases rent-seeking (Mehlum et al., 2006). As a result, we use 
the rule of law as a second control variable. An overview of all the variables used in the 
study, including their measures, is reported in Table II below.  
 
Insert TABLE II about Here 
 
Empirical Results 
Table III below presents the means, medians, standard deviations, and Z statistics for 
the results of hypotheses 1 through 5. The results show that the establishment of a 
professional oversight body is negatively related to perceived corruption (Z = -4.022, p < 
.01). H1 is supported. H2 suggests that a requirement for academic study in order to obtain an 
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auditing license will be negatively related to perceived corruption. The results support H2 (Z 
= -2.057, p < .05). H3 is also supported as countries that required practical experience for 
auditors were perceived to have significantly less corruption (Z = -2.198, p < .05). Countries 
that required a licensing exam were also perceived to have significantly less corruption (Z = -
2.745, p < .01).  Thus, H4 was supported. However, H5 was not supported as the relationship 
between continuing professional development and perceived corruption was not significant 
(Z = -0.280, p > .10).  
 
Insert TABLE III About Here 
 
Table IV below depicts the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations among 
variables that are used to examine hypothesis 6. Table V provides the results of the 
multivariate analysis. The results of these analyses suggest that the index of audit education 
standards and the existence of an oversight body are significant in explaining corruption 
(p<.05). 
Insert TABLE IV and TABLE V About Here 
 
Discussion and Future Research 
The results of this study suggest that countries that have an audit profession oversight 
body are perceived to be less corrupt than countries that do not have an audit profession 
oversight body. Results also suggest that countries that require academic study, practical 
experience, and a licensing exam in order to obtain an auditing license are also perceived to 
be less corrupt. However, the results indicate that the requirement to have continuing 
professional development in order for auditors to retain their licenses is not significantly 
related to a country‘s perceived level of corruption. It may be that continuing professional 
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development programs are devalued for auditors that are active under the assumption that 
practical experience will trump what might be learned in specific development programs. Or 
perhaps it is viewed that setting a high bar to earn a license to audit is much more important 
than the ongoing maintenance of the license with regards to inhibiting corruption.    
Further analysis of the data used in this study suggests that the development of the 
accounting profession within a country typically goes through two stages of development. 
The first stage of development typically includes a combination of several certifying 
requirements for auditors. Such certifying requirements may include academic study, 
professional experience, licensing exams, and/or continuing professional development. Once 
these basic requirements are met, accounting professions within a country will then typically 
implement an audit profession oversight body. For example, fourteen countries from Africa – 
a region of world considered to have many “lesser developed” countries (United Nations, 
2007) – only had two countries with an audit profession oversight body. On the other hand, of 
the eight countries from Western Europe – a region of the world considered to be composed 
of “developed countries” – five countries had established an audit profession oversight body. 
The correlation between regulatory bodies and procedures and developed countries is 
not new (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2002) and has been considered to be a deterrent 
against corruption and other forms of inappropriate behaviour for some time. Because of the 
relationship between regulatory bodies and procedures and developed countries, developing 
nations are at an increased risk for corruption. As such, many scholars have suggested that 
many developing countries throughout Asia were particularly vulnerable during the Asian 
financial crisis (Fischer 1998; Haggard, 2000). Furthermore, scholars have even suggested 
that the recent world financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 is the result of a lack of regulation and 
oversight in both developed and underdeveloped countries (Appelbaum and Cho, 2009; 
Hamilton, 2009). For this reason, financial experts from over 20 countries have proposed that 
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all countries, especially developing countries, need more regulation and oversight of fiscal 
institutions including better accounting and auditing standards (Group of Twenty 
Industrialized and Developing Economies, 2009). 
In many industrial and developed countries, the audit profession is subject to discipline 
in addition to those imposed by oversight institutions. Such discipline includes civil litigation 
and similar consequences that result from unprofessional behaviour, including corruption, by 
auditors. The threat of such sanctions on the audit profession creates an enormous pressure 
for auditors to behave ethically. On the other hand, in some of the least developed countries 
rule of law is so low that the possibility of these sanctions is minimal or non-existent. 
The recommendation to have an audit profession oversight body has not been stressed 
as an important step in the development of an audit profession within a country until the last 
few years. As has been stated, having an audit profession oversight body is usually one of the 
last regulatory developments in maturing economies. In analysing those countries that have 
established an audit profession oversight body, it is interesting to note that, in general, their 
auditing profession and business regulatory environments are quite advanced. As a group, 
they are perceived to be significantly less corrupt than those countries that have not 
established such bodies.   
While this study reviews different regulation for auditors from around the world, the 
international audit profession is converging to some generally accepted audit regulations. The 
most representative example of this convergence is found in the European Union. Directives 
EU 1984 and 2006 established legislation for a common framework for the competence of 
auditors. This directive sets minimum requirements including a university degree, practical 
experience, and a written examination in order to be certified as an auditor. In addition to 
these minimum criteria, European Union members are allowed to apply additional 
requirements at the country level, as each country sees fit. As a result, most auditors 
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throughout the European Union have received practical experience and passed an audit 
examination before becoming a licensed auditor.  
As the auditing profession continues to move towards international auditing standards, 
this research may provide a foundation for additional research to better understand the most 
effective education model for auditors. In fact, in recent years a debate has emerged between 
the chartered accountant model of accounting education that stresses more practical 
experience and less formal education and the US-type academic model that stresses more 
formal education and less practical experience. Future research could address which type of 
accounting education and regulation has the greatest impact on the deterrence of corruption. 
Such a study may provide information to determine if professional auditor training should be 
focused on formal education requirements or practical experience. 
In a sense, this research is only an exploratory study into the relationship between 
country-specific audit practices and corruption. As a result, the analysis presented in this 
paper does not examine the quality of the oversight body in place nor the varying degrees of 
auditor requirements. For example, in this study we hypothesized the presence of an 
oversight body to be positively associated with lower levels of corruption. Nevertheless, the 
presence of oversight does not equal judicious oversight. It might be the case in some 
countries that an abuse of power through oversight bodies could be the source of much of the 
corruption. Future research could aim to investigate the attributes of particular oversight 
bodies across countries. Furthermore, this study is incomplete and calls for further research as 
it does not examine the varying degrees of auditor requirements. For instance, the difference 
between the types of exams and the specific training (i.e. continuing professional 
development – CPD) that are required by each country in order to gain and retain auditing 
license is not measured. In this study we only examine whether or not a country does or does 
not have a licensing exam and CPD in order to obtain and retain an auditing license. In this 
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vein, a potential explanation for the lack of relationship found between CPD and corruption 
(H5) could be associated with the type of training required instead of the simple 
presence/amount of CPD offered by each country. An area for future research may be to 
investigate this and the other descriptive and comparative auditor requirements for different 
countries. Case studies on auditor regulation and audit profession oversight bodies are 
especially needed.  
Finally, there may be some interesting cross-cultural research opportunities.  For 
example, it is interesting to note that while some areas of the world – such as ex-communist 
countries (e.g. Eastern Bloc States) – have high levels of regulation in place, these countries 
are still perceived to have high levels of corruption. This is consistent with previous research 
that suggests that regulation, in and of itself, does not lower corruption (Cheung, 1996). 
Various cultures view human behaviour through different lenses which results in profoundly 
different behavioural norms.  Hooker (2009) argued that there are two broad classifications of 
norms – rule-based norms evolve from the fundamental respect for rules and relationship-
based norms are regulated by a respect for authority figures and connections with one’s 
network.  It would be naïve to expect that a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation would be 
equally effective in rules-based and relationship-based cultures.  Future research could shed 
light on the types of regulation that are most effective for any particular cultural norm.  It 
would also be very interesting to see more research on the relationship between the general 
cultural dimensions of countries and the types of corruption that are common, the use of 
regulatory standards, the types of regulatory standards, and the effectiveness of regulatory 
standards.  For example, Sanyal & Guvenli (2009) found that different cultural dimensions 
(e.g. power distance) helped to explain the difference in countries’ propensity to engage in 
bribery but less so than the general economic condition of the countries.  In a similar manner, 
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research could be extended to examine how cultural dimensions might be related to 
corruption in accounting and related general oversight practices. 
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this paper has been to further examine the relationship between country-
specific audit regulation and perceived corruption. Since a higher perceived level of 
corruption curtails foreign investment and hurts gross domestic product, implementing audit 
education and regulations that are significantly associated with less perceived corruption may 
be a vital step in the fight against corruption. 
While the results reported in this study test many international auditing 
recommendations, specifically those of the International Federation of Accountants, 
additional research is warranted to better understand the effects that international audit 
recommendations have upon countries‘ economies, societies, and the audit profession as a 
whole. 
In conclusion, this paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between 
corruption and the audit profession in several ways. First, the study examines a relationship in 
which little empirical research has been developed – bringing new insight to the international 
audit community. Second, the research presented in this paper provides an in-depth 
investigation into the recent and, for the most part, unexplored IFAC database on the 
regulatory and standard-setting framework for the audit profession. Finally, this study has 
suggested a significant positive relationship between the use of oversight bodies and licensing 
requirements and a lower perception of corruption, providing empirical evidence of the 
importance of such measures. This study has been a first step only and additional research is 
needed to better understand the relationship between the audit profession and corruption. 
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TABLE I 
 
Audit Requirements per Country  
 
Country Oversight Body 
Academic 
Studies 
Required 
Professional 
Experience 
Required 
License 
Exam 
Cont.Prof. 
Devel. 
Required 
Education 
Quality 
Professional 
Experience 
Cont. Prof. 
Devel. IAES
†
 
 1 = yes, 0 = no Rating Years CPD 
requirement 
 
Albania 1 1 1 1 1 3.3 3 7 0.62 
Argentina 0 1 0 0 0 2.9 - - 0.12 
Armenia 0 0 0 1 0 3.0 - - 0.25 
Australia 1 1 1 0 1 5.5 3 11 0.54 
Austria 0 1 1 1 1 5.2 3 8 0.72 
Azerbaijan  0 1 1 1 1 3.3 3 8 0.64 
Bangladesh 0 0 1 1 1 2.9 2 6 0.44 
Barbados 0 0 1 0 1 5.1 - 7 0.13 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 6.0 3 10 0.79 
Botswana 0 1 1 1 1 3.8 3 8 0.66 
Brazil 0 1 0 1 1 2.7 - 8 0.51 
Bulgaria 0 1 1 1 1 3.3 4 9 0.70 
Chile 0 1 0 0 0 3.2 - - 0.13 
China 1 0 1 1 1 3.8 2 7 0.46 
Cyprus 0 0 1 1 0 5.4 3 - 0.36 
Czech Re. 0 1 1 1 1 4.7 3 10 0.74 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 0 5.8 3 - 0.59 
Dominican  0 1 0 0 0 2.2 - - 0.09 
Estonia 0 1 1 1 1 4.5 3 9 0.71 
Fiji 0 0 0 0 0  - - - 
Finland 1 1 1 1 0 6.2 3 - 0.61 
France 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 3 11 0.77 
Germany 1 1 1 0 0 4.9 2 - 0.27 
Ghana 0 1 1 0 1 3.4 4 8 0.43 
Greece 1 1 0 0 0 3.3 - - 0.13 
Guatemala 1 1 0 0 0 2.6 - - 0.10 
Guyana 0 1 1 0 1 3.6 3 7 0.39 
Hong Kong 1 0 1 1 0 4.9 3 - 0.36 
Hungary 0 1 1 1 1 3.2 3 11 0.70 
Iceland 0 1 1 1 1 5.9 3 8 0.75 
India 0 1 1 0 1 4.3 3 8 0.43 
Indonesia 0 1 1 0 1 4.2 - 10 0.36 
Iran 0 0 1 0 1  6 10 0.41 
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 5.6 3 12 0.81 
Israel 1 1 1 1 0 4.0 2 - 0.48 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 3.2 3 10 0.68 
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 0 0 2.9 - - - 
Jamaica 1 1 1 0 1 3.0 3 9 0.40 
Japan 1 0 1 1 1 4.5 3 11 0.57 
Jordan 0 1 1 1 1 4.6 3 - 0.54 
Kazakhstan 0 1 1 0 1 3.6 3 11 0.46 
Kenya 0 1 1 0 1 4.4 3 9 0.46 
Korea 1 1 1 1 0 4.6 2 - 0.51 
Kuwait 0 1 1 1 0 3.1 5 - 0.55 
Kyrgyzstan 0 1 1 1 1 3.4 1 8 0.58 
Latvia 0 1 1 0 1 3.7 3 8 0.41 
Lesotho 0 1 1 0 1 3.3 3 10 0.43 
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 3.7 3 8 0.66 
Madagascar 0 0 0 1 0 2.9 - - 0.25 
Malawi 0 0 1 1 1 3.6 3 10 0.55 
Malaysia 0 1 1 0 1 5.0 3 9 0.48 
Malta 1 1 1 0 1 4.9 3 9 0.48 
Mexico 0 1 0 0 0 2.8 3 - 0.11 
Moldova 0 1 1 1 0 3.2 5 - 0.56 
Mongolia 1 1 1 0 1 2.5 2 6 0.29 
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1 3.0 - 9 0.42 
(cont.) 
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Country Oversight Body 
Academic 
Studies 
Required 
Professional 
Experience 
Required 
License 
Exam 
Cont. 
Prof. 
Devel. 
Required 
Education 
Quality 
Professional 
Experience 
Cont. 
Prof. 
Devel. 
IAES† 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 - - - 
Nepal 0 1 1 0 0 3.0 3 0 0.23 
Netherlands 1 1 1 0 1 5.3 3 8 0.47 
New Zealand 0 0 1 0 1 4.9 3 9 0.28 
Nigeria 0 0 1 0 1 3.7 2.5 8 0.24 
Norway 1 1 1 0 1 5.4 3 7 0.46 
Pakistan 0 1 1 0 0 2.9 3 - 0.22 
Panama 0 1 0 0 0 2.8 - 0 0.11 
Poland 0 1 1 1 1 3.8 3 - 0.51 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 0 3.5 3 - 0.50 
Romania 0 1 1 1 1 3.6 3 11 0.71 
Russia 1 1 1 1 1 4.3 3 11 0.74 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 1 1 1 3.6 3 13 0.75 
Singapore 1 1 1 0 1 6.2 3 9 0.53 
Slovakia 0 1 1 0 1 3.4 5 9 0.49 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 4.4 5 8 0.76 
South Africa 1 0 0 0 0 2.8 - - - 
Spain 0 1 1 1 1 3.8 3 7 0.64 
Sri Lanka 1 1 1 0 1 4.1 4 - 0.31 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 0 5.3 3 - 0.57 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 6.0 7 13 0.99 
Tanzania 0 0 1 0 1 3.1 3 10 0.30 
Thailand 0 1 1 1 1 3.8 3 - 0.51 
Trinidad 0 0 1 0 1 4.1 3 8 0.26 
Turkey 0 1 1 1 0 3.4 2 - 0.46 
Ukraine 0 0 1 0 1 4.2 2 8 0.23 
United K. 1 1 1 1 1 4.6 3 10 0.73 
United Statesa 1 1 1 1 1 5.0 1 13 0.74 
Uzbekistan 1 0 0 0 1  3 9 0.17 
Zambia 0 0 1 0 1 3.6 3 10 0.30 
Zimbabwe 0 1 1 0 1 4.1 3 10 0.46 
 
Note: Descriptive Analysis of the Number of ― “Yes” Answers to Each of the Questions in the Assessment Regarding the 
Existence of an Audit Profession Oversight Body as well as the Existence of Requirements for Academic Study, Practical 
Experience, Licensing Exam, and Continuing Professional Development in Order to Receive and Retain an Audit License (1 
= yes, 0 = no). Further, this table describe the variables (i.e. Education Quality, Years of Professional Experience, and CPD 
requirement) used to weight the Index of Audit Education Standard (IAES) (see Table II for a description of variables).  
†IAES = (Academic Studies Required*Education Quality/Max(Education Quality)*0.25)+(Professional Experience 
Required*Years Professional Experience/Max(Years Professional experience)*0.25)+(Continuing Prof. Devel. 
Required*CPD Requir./Max(CPD Requir.)*0.25)+ (Lic. Exam*0.25) 
a
 “The experience requirement varies from zero (in 2 states) to 2 years (in 20 states). The balance of the states require one 
year of experience. Most states require a component of the experience to be in audit and assurance services.” (IFAC Survey, 
Assessment of the Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants - 2006) 
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TABLE II 
 
Description of the dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable Description 
Oversight Body  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country have established an audit professional oversight 
body; 0 otherwise. From the IFAC survey ―Assessment of the Regulatory and Standard-Setting 
Framework. 
Academic Study Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country requires academic study to professional to obtain an 
audit license; 0 otherwise. From the IFAC survey ―Assessment of the Regulatory and 
Standard-Setting Framework. 
Professional 
Experience  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country requires practical experience to professional to 
obtain an audit license; 0 otherwise. From the IFAC survey ―Assessment of the Regulatory and 
Standard-Setting Framework. 
License Exam  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country requires license exam to professional to obtain an 
audit license; 0 otherwise. From the IFAC survey ―Assessment of the Regulatory and 
Standard-Setting Framework. 
Continuing 
Professional 
Development  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the country requires continuing professional development to 
auditor to retain an audit license; 0 otherwise. From the IFAC survey ―Assessment of the 
Regulatory and Standard-Setting Framework. 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) 
Refers to CPI 2006 from the Transparency International. 
Education Quality Quality of the higher education and training as presented by The Global Competitiveness Report 
2008-2009. Greater scores represent greater higher education system. 
Years Professional 
Experience  
From the IFAC survey ―Part 1 and Part 2, refers to the number of years required for each 
country for a professional to become a licensed auditor. 
CPD Requirements Summation of CPD requirements as in the IFAC survey ― Response to the IFAC Part 2, 
Statements of Membership Obligations Self-Assessment Questionnaire. See Appendix A for 
detailed list of questions and items taken into consideration.   
Index of Audit 
Education Standards 
(IEAS) 
The IAES corresponds to a weighted composite that takes into account the requirements of 
academic studies, professional experience, proficiency exam, and continuing professional 
development. The existence of academic studies is weighted by quality of the education system. 
The requirement for professional experience was weighted by the number of years required for 
each country for a professional to become a licensed auditor. Continuing professional 
development was weighted by summation of several characteristics required by each country 
(see Appendix A). The index is weighted such that the minimum score is 0 and the maximum is 
1, being 0 equals to no requirement for audit license to be granted and 1 equal to the higher level 
of requirements. 
Economic Freedom  Economic freedom represents the fundamental right of every human to be in command of 
his/her own labour and property. The Index of Economic Freedom refers to the period of 2006 
and was gathered from The Heritage Foundation at www.heritage.org. 
Rule of Law Measures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and 
courts. In this paper we use data provided by the World Bank for the period of 2006. 
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TABLE III 
 
Descriptive statistics and Mann-Whitney U test 
 
Hypothesis Requirement Group N Mean  Median Std.Dev. Z 
        
H1 
Establishment of Audit 
Professional Oversight Body  
No 54 3.94 3.25 1.85 
-4.022** Yes 33 6.26 6.60 2.45 
H2 
Academic Study Requirement 
to Obtain an Audit License  
No 22 4.01 3.15 2.17 
-2.057* Yes 65 5.10 4.70 2.39 
H3 
Practical Experience 
Requirement to Obtain an 
Audit License  
No 16 3.49 3.15 1.25 
-2.198* Yes 71 5.12 4.80 2.47 
H4 
Licensing Exam Requirement 
to Obtain an Audit License  
No 42 4.20 3.20 2.28 
-2.745** Yes 45 5.40 5.10 2.34 
H5 
Continuing Professional 
Development Requirement to 
Retain an Audit License  
No 27 4.87 4.10 2.37 
-0.280 Yes 60 4.80 3.70 2.40 
CPI = Dependent variable. * p < .05; ** p < .01(two-tailed tests). 
 
 
TABLE IV 
 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Bivariate Correlation a 
 
 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skew. Kurtosis (1) (2) (3) (4) 
           
(1) CPI 4.82 2.37 2.00 10.00 0.70 -0.86 
    
(2) IAES 0.45 0.22 0.00 0.99 -0.19 -0.56 0.403**    
(3) Oversight  0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.50 -1.78 0.477** 0.234*   
(4) Ec. Free. 63.89 9.79 33.54 88.61 0.15 0.47 0.813** 0.294** 0.373**  
(5) Log(Rule of Law) 1.67 0.32 0.28 2.00 -1.92 4.65 0.727** 0.334** 0.281** 0.716** 
a
 Pearson correlation reported. n = 87; * p < .05; ** p < .01(two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE V 
 
The following table examines the relationship between the corruption perception index and the index 
of audit education standards (IAES) and oversight body, while including control variables.  
 
Y = α + β1IAES + β2Oversight + β3EconomicFreedom + β3Log(Rule of Law) + ε 
 
    
 (1)  (2) 
 Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
      
Intercept 2.588** 5.300  -7.374** -8.160 
IAES 3.289** 3.327  1.279* 2.019 
Oversight 1.971** 4.360  0.877** 2.990 
Econ.Freedom    0.127** 6.367 
Rule of Law    1.897** 3.268 
      
R2 (adj) 0.301   0.737  
F-stat 19.510**   61.33**  
Max_VIF 1.058   2.199  
N 87   87  
Note: Dependent variable = CPI 2006. * p < .05; ** p < .01(two-tailed tests). 
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Appendix A 
 
CPD Requirements Assessed by IFAC Survey Part 2  
(Cursive characters explain the value given to the answer used to compose the CPD requirement 
weight). 
 
 
2.14.2. Which membership categories are required to maintain professional competence through continuous professional 
development? Select all the answer options that are appropriate. 
 
1) All our qualified members (0 = non selected, 4 = selected) 
2) Qualified members who perform audits of listed entities (Only if first item different from 4, 0 = non selected, 1 = 
selected) 
3) Qualified members who perform audits of entities other than listed entities (as above) 
4) Qualified members who provide services (other than audit) to the public (as above) 
5) Qualified members who are employed in business (as above) 
 
2.14.3.1. Type of CPD Requirement - Which of the following answer options describes the way the continuous professional 
development is structured? Select all the answer options that are appropriate. (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
 
1) Members must satisfy a number of hours of continuous professional development a year or over a number of years 
2) All members are to satisfy specified content requirements (e.g. Specified courses or knowledge content) 
3) Members working in specialist areas or areas of high risk to the public are to satisfy specified content requirements 
(e.g. Specified courses or knowledge content) 
 
2.14.3.3. Hours of Continuous Professional Development - Which one of the following answer options best describes the 
continuous professional development hours required? 
 
1) Members have to complete a minimum of 120 hours or equivalent learning units of relevant professional development 
activity over a three-year rolling period. (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
2) Members have to complete a minimum of 20 hours or equivalent learning units in each year (0 = selected) 
 
2.14.3.8. Monitoring of CPD - Is there a process to monitor whether your members who are qualified as professional 
accountants meet the continuous professional development requirements? 
 
1) Yes, there is a monitoring process for CPD requirements (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
2) No, there is no monitoring process for CPD requirements  ( 0 = selected) 
 
2.14.4.1. Monitoring Process SMO 2 - Which of the following elements does the monitoring process include? Select all the 
answer options that are appropriate. 
 
1) Professional accountants are required to submit a declaration (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
2)  Professional accountants are required to submit evidence (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
3)  Our organization audits a sample of professional accountants to check compliance (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
4)  Compliance is monitored through firm quality control standards (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
5)  Compliance is monitored through a quality assurance review program (0 = non selected, 1 = selected) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
